

SECRET SENSITIVE

[Iranian Second
Channel A]

SUBJECT: Rundown of Visitor's comments on 19/20 Sept 86

1. [] said that they had had a real problem in determining whether overtures made to them were genuine or not. []

[] He said they also did not know what to make of the approach via Gorbaniyar and [Iranian First Channel A] because they had fielded many such approaches from arms dealers in the past. They also were curious about the approaches from Senator Kennedy and Alexander Haig. The Haig approach blew their mind because it was via an Iranian hair dresser in Europe. After our May visit, and their mishandling of it, a serious debate took place in Tehran about how to proceed. [] said they had to upgrade the channel and now think they have made the necessary arrangements. [] was told that the three persons in the room would be the only ones on our side until things got further along. [] said that he would be in charge on their side. In an aside, he said that [Iranian First Channel A] was too dumb to handle the channel. [] emphasized that they wanted to gradually improve relations with the United States because they fully realized they were between a rock and a hard place. The war will end soon and Iran must make the fateful decision about rebuilding the military and the country. Since the previous orientation was towards American equipment, they would like to continue in the same manner. They realize that American investment will be essential to the rebuilding of their country. However, for the time being, everything must be carried out in secret. If this were to leak, the radicals would have a field day and would be able to oust the moderates and the conservatives. [] said that when our delegation was in Tehran, the factions that were aware of our presence had put together a story to be released if word somehow got out about our delegation's presence in Tehran. We told him that we faced similar problems in the United States. [Iranian Sec Channel A]

2. With regard to the Gorbaniyar [Iranian First Channel A] connection, [] said flatly they mistrust Gorbaniyar. We told him that we entertain similar views but are worried about his going public and destroying everything. [] said that they think they can take care of Gorba. He was almost executed in 1981. They have a lot on him and he also has family back in Tehran. The U.S. side is doubtful. Believe this remains a problem since Gorba has told NIR that he would go public. [] said that, although they are grateful to [Iranian First Channel A] for having the courage to get things started, they want him out of the loop because (A) he

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has not produced and (3) they do not think him smart enough to handle the contact. Further, they have just uncovered evidence

[] In addition, [] said [Iranian First Channel A] played a role in the Reed kidnapping. He did this as a means of putting additional pressure on the U.S. to send the next shipment. []

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[] suggested that, if [Iranian First Channel A] calls again, Sam should tell him that everything is up in the air because of the two new hostages and that nothing can be done until they are released.

3. During our discussion, [] emphasized that they are also interested in relations with us on the strategic level. They are very concerned about Soviet machinations in the area as a whole and in recent months have had their eyes opened by how much effort the Soviets are putting into penetrating and manipulating the Iranian government. []

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[] The Iranians agree that we should put the past behind us, and [] said they regret our fruitless trip to Tehran in May. [] proposed a joint committee which would handle the channel and establish secure communications between the two governments. The opening phase will be secret but we will then bring the relationship into the open at an appropriate time.

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4. Hostages: The U.S. side dealt with the hostage issue as an obstacle, not a key issue in arriving at a strategic relationship. [] said that prior to coming on this trip he had talked with the "person directly responsible" twice on the telephone and once personally. He believes that this issue can be resolved and it will be one of the first things he devotes his attention to when he returns to Tehran. He said that it is now a matter of policy that the Iranian government opposes hostage taking and terrorism on humanitarian grounds. He reminded us that the Iranian government did play a positive role in the TWA hijacking case. He said that in addition to recent public statements, Khomeini has prepared a "fatwa" condemning hostage-taking as "unIslamic". We thanked him for the Iranian stance on the hijacking of the PanAm flight in Karachi. [] was told that next week there would be a VOA broadcast in which Iran would be mentioned as one of the States we wished to thank for refusing to grant landing rights to the hijackers. [Iranian Second Channel D] also told "Sam" in an aside that he

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had discussed the hostages with [] earlier and he was certain that the matter would soon be settled. [] also stated that the Parris case would be resolved satisfactorily. The people holding the hostages are very worried about a CIA operation to rescue the hostages. [] urged that we not do anything to fan their fears, as this could make his job harder. He said that he would try to give us 2 or 3 days advanced notice before the hostages are released.

5. Afghanistan: [] said that they are most anxious to cooperate with us on the subject of Afghanistan. They have set up a logistics/training base near the border. They have tried to teach the mujahidin based on Iran's experience, but a lot of it has to do with equipment. For instance, the mujahidin fear the MI-24 gunship. Iran, on the other hand, believes it is a piece of junk. They have had very good success in shooting them down with Red Eye missiles. The MI-24's problem is that it is not very maneuverable; once the missile is locked on target, the MI-24 is a dead duck. Iran has an extremely high hit ratio. Also a pasdar disabled an Iraqi T-72 tank with an RPG. He was 80 meters from the tank when he fired. We pointed out that it takes a lot of guts to fire a missile when you are that close. The other major problem for the Mujahiddin are the Soviet Spetznaz troops. They are very effective. The only battle with Spetznaz which the Mujahiddin won out was recently one near Herat where they also took a couple of Spetznaz prisoners.

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6. Joint Committee: There was a lot of discussion about a secret US-Iran Joint Committee. [] towards the end of the meetings, stated that they had already set up three people to be on their side. We told him that ours would be three persons also, consisting of "Goode, Kopp and Sam". [] said that they would pick a single courier would carry things from Tehran to where ever we designate as committee Hdqs. We suggested that secure communications be established as soon as possible and [] agreed. We returned to our May suggestion of a two man commo team in Tehran. [] liked this and said that he would bring it up in Tehran.

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7. [] provided a list of their urgent military requirements. This included tactical intelligence on Iraq which he said they needed desperately. [] said that they badly need 105 and 155 mm howitzers and 175 mm base plate RAP rounds. He asked "Sam" to ship some of these (as much as we can assemble on short notice) as soon as possible. On the shipment that we have put together, [] said to give him an account number as soon as we are ready, and he will have the money ready. He wanted to take the list back and make sure they really needed the spare parts before giving the go-ahead on the shipment. He said that their need for artillery is pressing because they need suppressing fire to make their infantry attacks more successful.

US PARTICIPANTS: George Cave as "Colonel Sam O'Neill"
Oliver North as "Colonel Goode"
Dick Seacord as "General Kopp"

IRANIAN PARTICIPANT: [

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